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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAHf : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 
v. J Priority No. 13 
WENDY L. MUNSEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the court of appeals misconstrue this Court's 
directive in State v. Mendoza, 784 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), in 
applying a correction of error standard of review to the trial 
court's determination of reasonable suspicion? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is 
State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (a copy is 
contained in the addendum). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals issued its decision reversing the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
on November 7, 1991. Following the denial of its petition for a 
rehearing on January 30, 1992, the State timely filed a request 
for an extension of time in which to file this petition, which 
was granted. This Court has jurisdiction to consider this 
petition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Wendy L. Munsen, was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1990) (Record [R.] at 6). Following the trial court's 
denial of her motion to suppress evidence, defendant entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to the reduced charge of possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990)1 (R. 6, 18, 38, 
24-30). 
On November 7, 1991, the court of appeals reversed the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the 
basis that the trial court erred in finding that there was 
reasonable suspicion to seize defendant. State v. Munsen, 821 
P.2d 13, 16 (Utah App. 1991) (Garff, Russon JJ.). Concurring in 
the result only, Judge Jackson agreed with the trial court that 
1
 Although the original information was amended by 
interlineation on February 2, 1990, the trial court apparently 
neglected to insert the corresponding statute; thus, the 
information in the record erroneously cites Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990). 
2 
there was reasonable suspicion to justify defendant's seizure, 
but disagreed that the length and scope of the detention was 
justified by the circumstances. Munsen, 821 P.2d at 16-17 
(Jackson, J. concurring). 
The facts of the case as set out in the court of 
appeals' opinion are sufficient for the purposes of this 
petition: 
On November 26, 1989f at about 3:30 a.m., 
Officer Jeff Jensen of the Midvale City 
Police was patrolling the parking lot of 
Smith's Food King in Midvale, Utah. This 
store is open twenty-four hours a day. 
Officer Jensen observed a pickup truck parked 
"by itself" in the lot. On closer 
observation, he noticed a man lying on the 
seat of the truck, apparently working with 
the car stereo. 
Officer Jensen questioned the man, who 
identified himself as Alan Hunter. The 
vehicle registration, which Hunter produced 
at the officer's request, indicated that 
someone other than Hunter owned the vehicle. 
Hunter stated he had purchased the truck at a 
pawnshop. Officer Jensen noticed a driver's 
license on the seat of the truck. The 
license listed a woman's name and bore the 
photograph of a woman. Hunter also stated 
that he did not know where the license came 
from. He offered that it might belong to his 
girlfriend, who he said, was in the store. 
During this questioning, Officer Jensen 
noticed appellant Wendy L. Munsen exit the 
supermarket and walk in the direction of the 
truck. There were no other vehicles or 
people near Officer Jensen and Hunter. 
Officer Jensen intercepted Munsen to see 
whether she could confirm Hunter's 
explanation about who he was and what he was 
doing, and to see whether she had a role in 
any possible criminal activity. 
Officer Jensen asked Munsen if she knew 
Hunter. She replied that she had known him 
3 
for one yearf and that his name was "Hunt" or 
"Hunter." Officer Jensen then had Munsen 
wait in the patrol car while he obtained 
field card information and ran a warrants 
check on her. Because the check on Munsen 
turned up several outstanding warrants, 
Officer Jensen arrested her. During a search 
of Munsen's person, incident to her arrest, 
Officer Jensen discovered the controlled 
substance, methamphetamine. Munsen was later 
charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony. 
Munsen, 821 P.2d at 14. 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the trial 
court ruled that Officer Jensen's actions "were reasonable and 
proper under the circumstances" and that the "brief detention of 
defendant to obtain 'field card' information and check for 
outstanding warrants [was] reasonable" (R. 36-37). 
INTRODUCTION 
In its opinion below, the court of appeals departed 
from this Court's directive in State v. Mendoza 784 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987), and applied a correction of error standard of review 
to the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion. The 
opinion directly misconstrues Mendoza and is in conflict, not 
only with Mendoza, but with previous panels of the court of 
appeals. As a result of the court of appeals' decision, the 
precedent in this State concerning the standard of review to be 
applied to a trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion 
has become unsettled. This Court should grant certiorari to 
clarify this important question of law. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
IN APPLYING A "CORRECTION OF ERROR" STANDARD 
OF REVIEW TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION CONFLICTS WITH PRECEDENT FROM THIS 
COURT AND PREVIOUS PANELS OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS WHICH TREAT A DETERMINATION OF 
REASONABLE SUSPICION AS A FACTUAL FINDING, 
PROPERLY REVIEWED UNDER A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
STANDARD; THEREFORE THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT 
CERTIORARI TO SETTLE THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION 
OF LAW, 
In State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991), 
the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion in support of its denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. However, in reviewing the lower court's 
determination the Munsen majority misapplied controlling 
precedent from this Court, citing State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987), as support for its erroneous treatment of reasonable 
suspicion as a mixed question of fact and law, subject to a 
correction of error standard of review. Munsen, 821 P.2d at 15. 
In so misconstruing Mendoza, which articulated a clearly 
erroneous standard for review of a trial court's reasonable 
suspicion determination, the Munsen majority established a direct 
conflict with this Court and with previous panels of the court of 
appeals. Since Mendoza this Court has not suggested any 
modification of the standard of review applicable to reasonable 
suspicion determinations. See, e.g., State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 
646, 649-51 (Utah 1989) (where issue was validity of stop based 
on reasonable suspicion, this Court found no clear error in trial 
court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to deny motion 
5 
to suppress); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38 
(Utah 1989) (refuting State's assertion that judge erroneously 
applied a probable cause standard instead of a reasonable 
suspicion standard in suppression hearing, and noting that there 
was no clear error in trial court's ruling that the facts failed 
to support even an articulable suspicion). 
With the exception of Munsen, the court of appeals has 
relied on Mendoza in applying a clearly erroneous standard of 
review to its evaluation of a trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion. State v. Roth, No. 910100-CA (Utah App. 
Feb. 21, 1992) (Bench, Billings, Russon, JJ.)/ State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (Davidson, Billings, Jackson, 
JJ.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990) 
(Billings, Greenwood, Orme, JJ.); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 
941-42 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, Orme, Davidson, JJ.). See also 
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991) (Jackson, 
Bench, Russon, JJ.)/ State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 509-10 (Utah 
App. 1989) (Bench, Billings, Greenwood, JJ.) (reviewing the trial 
court's finding of reasonable suspicion under a clearly erroneous 
standard without expressly relying on Mendoza). 
Notwithstanding Mendoza's directive, and its own 
precedent, the court of appeals has recently expressed confusion 
as to the appropriate standard of review to apply to a lower 
court's determination of reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., State 
v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 n.6 (Utah 1991) (Billings, Garff, 
Orme, JJ.) (questioning whether the trial court's determination 
6 
of reasonable suspicion is a question of fact or a conclusion of 
law); State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135r 138 n.3 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Billings, Garff, Russon, JJ.) (citing Carter for the 
"problematic issue" of whether a ruling on reasonable suspicion 
is a finding of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, 
or a conclusion of law reviewed under a correction of error 
standard). Although both Carter and Blackwell express confusion 
and concern over the appropriate standard of review, neither 
panel ultimately resolved the issue. 
In Munsen, unlike Carter and Blackwell, the court of 
appeals directly reviewed the trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion. Munsen 821 P.2d at 15. However, contrary 
to Carter and Blackwell, the majority in Munsen refused to even 
acknowledge Mendoza's directive, and without any analysis or 
explanation, included Mendoza in a string cite as support for its 
contrary and erroneous treatment of reasonable suspicion as a 
mixed question of fact and law, subject to a correction of error 
standard of review. Munsen, 821 P.2d at 15. The conflict 
created by Munsen's application of a correction of error standard 
of review has unsettled the precedent in this area and thus 
provides a compelling basis for certiorari. Utah R. App. P. 
46(a), (b) and (d). In short, unless and until this Court 
disavows Mendoza, the clearly erroneous standard of review is 
binding on the court of appeals.2 
2
 A correct application of Mendoza would require the 
court of appeals to affirm the trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion. For, this is a close case, capable of 
7 
As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, the court of 
appeals' application of a correction of error standard of review 
in Munsen may well have determined the outcome of the court's 
decision. More importantly, it is in conflict with binding 
precedent from this Court and with previous decisions from the 
court of appeals. As a result of this conflict, the precedent in 
this sensitive area is in need of clarification from this Court. 
Therefore, this Court should grant certiorari and review the 
court of appeals' decision. Utah R. App. P. 46(a) (b) and (d). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^  5^ day of February, 1992. 




Assistant Attorney General 
supporting a finding either for, or against, reasonable 
suspicion; thus, the trial court's determination cannot 
reasonably be characterized as against the clear weight of the 
evidence. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, as illustrated in Judge Jackson's concurring 
opinion, the Munsen panel was not able to reach a "'definite and 
firm conviction'ft that the trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion was mistaken. .Id. (citing Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). 
Application of a correction of error standard of review, however, 
allowed the court of appeals to ignore the trial court's 
determination and reach its own conclusion as to the existence of 
reasonable suspicion. Munsen 821 P.2d at 16. 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Joan C. 
Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorney for respondent, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
of February, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
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P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.1990); 
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508-09 
(Utah App.1989). 
[9] Moreover, an investigatory deten-
tion must be "temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effect the purpose of 
the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
617 (Utah 1987) (citing United States p. 
MerritU 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), 
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1142,106 S.Ct 2250, 
90 L.Ed.2d 696 (1986)). 
[10] In this case, there was no deten-
tion subject to Fourth. Amendment protec-
tion when the police officer initially pulled 
in behind the stopped car. Nothing in the 
record suggests that the officer caused 
Davis to stop the car or that formal investi-
gation into possible criminal wrongdoing 
had begun when the officer first arrived. 
The car in which Davis was seated had 
stopped before the officer arrived, indepen-
dent of any action taken by the officer, 
express or implied, under show of authority 
or physical force.1 Davis had not been 
detained by the officer, even momentarily, 
and could have reasonably believed that he 
was free to drive away as the officer pulled 
up in his vehicle. MendenhaU, 446 U.S1 at 
554, 100 S.Ct at 1877. 
[11] However, the moment the officer 
saw a can of beer on the trunk of the car, 
an open passenger door, and a man urinat-
ing, the officer had a reasonable suspicion, 
based upon objective facts, that a crime 
had been committed. The officer then de-
tained Davis by a display of authority when 
he activated the overhead lights on his 
vehicle. Although there may be a host of 
other innocent explanations to account for 
the presence of the persons and the things 
in and around the car, the officer had a 
reasonable basis to believe that the man 
urinating had been a passenger in the car, 
and that he had been drinking during the 
time he had been a passenger. 
The officer had a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, of a violation of 
the open container law, since it is illegal for 
2. Davis cites several cases for the proposition 
that a police officer must have reasonable suspi-
cion to detain for a traffic violation. See Stale 
.. C ^ I A . . ^ . in A ntA t i n /!!•_!* mom. e#—#-, .. 
a passenger to drink any alcoholic bever-
age in a motor vehicle, whether or not the 
vehicle is moving, stopped or parked on a 
highway. See Utah Code Ann. ( 41-6-
44.20 (1990). In addition, the officer had a 
reasonable basis to suspect the driver of a 
related violation since it is illegal to allow 
another to keep, carry, possess or transport 
an open container of alcohol in the passen-
ger compartment of a motor vehicle when 
the vehicle is on the highway. Id. 
A peace officer has statutory authority 
to "stop any person in a public place when 
[the officer] has reasonable suspicion to 
believe [the person] has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1990). Therefore, the officer could proper-
ly approach Davis, and ask for proof of 
identification as part of his investigation. 
Based on objective facts learned in the 
course of his investigation, the officer had 
reasonable grounds to suspect Davis of 
drunk driving. The officer observed a can 
of beer on the car, smelted a strong odor of 
alcohol on Davis's breath, and found him to 
be uncooperative and argumentative. 
Davis's refusal to produce a driver's license 
also provided grounds to suspect Davis of a 
license-related violation. 
The factual findings of the trial court 
that the officer had probable cause were, 
therefore, not clearly erroneous. The? 
were not against the clear weight of evi-
dence, and we are not convinced that a 
mistake was made. 
The judgment of the trial court is there-
fore affirmed. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
(o |nvmmi»snnM> 
Carpenm. 714 PJtd 674 (Utah 1986). Since the 
police encounter in this case was not initiated 
by a traffic stop for a moving violation, Davis's 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wendy L. MUNSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 910031-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 7, 1991. 
STATE v. MUNSEN Utah 13 
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court will consider totality of circum-
stances to determine whether officer had 
specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from 
those facts, warrant a detention; court will 
determine whether officer observed usual 
conduct which led him reasonably to con-
clude in light of his experience that crimi-
nal activity may have been afoot U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Pat B. 
Brian, J., of possession of controlled sub-
stance, and defendant appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Garff, J., held that police offi-
cer did not have reasonable suspicion to 
justify stopping defendant 
Reversed and remanded. 
Jackson, J., concurred in result and 
filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law **1U4(S) 
Court of Appeals reviews ultimate con-
clusions drawn from trial court's findings 
as matter of law under correction of error 
standard, affording no deference to trial 
court 
2. Criminal Law ••1224(1) 
Police officer may approach citizen at 
anytime and pose questions so long as citi-
ten is not detained against will. U&CA. 
ijostAmend. 4. 
3. Arrest 0>6&5(4, 9) 
Police officer may seize person if offi-
cer has articulable suspicion that person 
has committed or is about to commit, crime, 
as long as detention is temporary and lasts 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of stop. U.S.CA. Const 
Amend. 4. 
4. Arrest *»63.4(1) 
Police officer may arrest suspect if 
officer has probable cause to believe of-
fense has been committed or is being com-
mitted. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Arrest *»*3.5(4) 
6. Arrest «=«3.5(4) 
To justify a stop, police officer must 
have particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting particular person stopped of 
criminal activity; person's mere propinqui-
ty to others independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, without more,, 
give rise to probable cause to search that 
person. U.S.GA, ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Arrest *»C&6<6) 
Mere fact that defendant was with per-
son who was engaging in arguably suspi-
cious behavior, and with regard to whom 
police officer suspected criminal activity, 
did not conjoin defendant's actions with 
those of the other person so as to give rise 
to reasonable suspicion to support police 
officer's stop of defendant U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
ft. Arrest *»«&5(6) 
Lateness of hour defendant exited 24-
hour grocery store had no particular signif-
icance in evaluating reasonable suspicion to 
stop defendant U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
9. Arrest «=*3.5(4) 
In determining whether responses to 
police officer's questioning are evasive and 
suspicious so as to give rise to reasonable 
suspicion to stop, police officers may rely 
on characteristics of area and behavior of 
suspect who appears to be evading police 
contact UJ3.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
10. Arrest «=**3.5<9) 
Defendant's statement, made in re-
sponse to police officer's question, that 
companion's name was "Hunt" or "Hunt-
er" was not inconsistent, vague, and suspi-
14 Utah 821 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
larized and objective basis to suspect defen-
dant of criminal activity, as required to 
support detention of defendant, where de-
fendant's responses to other questions by 
officer were consistent, direct, and appro-
priate. U&CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
11. Arrest *»63.5(4) 
If seizure occurs and police are unable 
to point to specific and articulable facts 
that justified seizure, seizure violates 
Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained 
as a result must be excluded. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Wendy L. Munsen, appeals the trial 
court's order denying her motion to sup-
press, which resulted in her conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance. We 
reverse and remand. 
Because the court's findings are not at 
issue, we rely on the court's findings of 
facts. On November 26, 1989, at about 
8:30 a.m., Officer Jeff Jensen of the Mid-
vale City Police was patrolling the parking 
lot of Smith's Food King in Midvale, Utah. 
This store is open twenty-four hours a day. 
Officer Jensen observed a pickup truck 
parked "by itself in the lot On closer 
observation, he noticed a man lying on the 
seat of the truck, apparently working with 
the car stereo. 
Officer Jensen questioned the man, who 
identified himself as Alan Hunter. The 
vehicle registration, which Hunter produc-
ed at the officer's request, indicated that 
someone other than Hunter owned the ve-
hicle. Hunter stated he had purchased the 
truck at a pawnshop. Officer Jensen no-
ticed a driver's license on the seat of the 
truck. The license listed a woman's name 
and bore the photograph of a woman. 
where the license came from. He offered 
that it might belong to his girlfriend, who 
he said, was in the store. 
During this questioning, Officer Jensen 
noticed appellant Wendy L. Munsen exit 
the supermarket and walk in the direction 
of the truck. There were no other vehicles 
or people near Officer Jensen and Hunter. 
Officer Jensen intercepted Munsen to see 
whether she could confirm Hunter's expla-
nation about who he was and what he was 
doing, and to see whether she had a role in 
any possible criminal activity. 
Officer Jensen asked Munsen if she 
knew Hunter. She replied that she had 
known him for one year, and that his name 
was "Hunt" or "Hunter." Officer Jensen 
then had Munsen wait in the patrol car 
while he obtained field card information 
and ran a warrants check on her. Because 
the check on Munsen turned up several 
outstanding warrants, Officer Jensen ar-
rested her. During a search of Munsen's 
person, incident to her arrest, Officer Jen-
sen discovered the controlled substance, 
methamphetamine. Munsen was later 
charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony. 
On January 3, 1990, Munsen moved to 
suppress all evidence seized from her on 
the ground that the detention and search of 
her person violated her Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. The trial court 
denied the motion, concluding that Officer 
Jensen's actions "were reasonable and 
proper under the circumstances" because 
of the "inconsistent, vague and suspicious 
answers received from the defendant and 
Mr. Hunter." On February 2, 1990, Mun-
sen entered a conditional plea of guilty to 
the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance, preserving her right to appeal 
the trial court's denial of her motion to 
suppress. 
[1] Munsen does not challenge the 
court's findings. Rather she challenges 
the court's application of the law to those 
findings. We "review the ultimate conclu-
sions drawn from those findings as a mat-
ter of law, under a correction of error 
•tan/toMl •ffmviinflr nn fb»ff»r*»fM*» ftn the 
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State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, tion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct at trial court 
565 (Utah App.1991). See State v. Mendo-
za, 748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 n. 6 (Utah App. 
1991). See also United States v. Hernan-
dez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th 
Cir.1989) (setting forth the generally held 
view that whether reasonable suspicion ex-
ists is a mixed question of fact and law, 
and the trial court's ultimate conclusion 
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal 
conclusion which is reviewed de novo). 
INITIAL DETENTION 
12-4] Munsen asserts that her initial de-
tention, while Officer Jensen ran a war-
rants check on her, violated her Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Both par-
ties agree that this detention was a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment Therefore, the issue is whether Of-
ficer Jensen had any reasonable suspicion 
justifying the detention.1 
The United States Supreme Court first 
articulated the requirement that an officer 
must have a reasonable suspicion to stop a 
person in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 
S.Ct 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
This concept was later codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempt-
ing to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an expla-
nation of his actions. 
[5] We also consider the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the of-
ficer had "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facts," warrant a deten-
1. We recognize three levels of police-citizen en-
counters, each of which requires a different 
degree of justification to be constitutionally per-
missible under the Fourth Amendment. 
(1) (A]n officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) 
an officer may seize a person if the officer has 
an "articulable suspicion" that the person has 
~*mm .»««Mi nr I* *hnut IA o u n m i l m crim^r 
1880; United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 
411, 418, 101 S.Ct 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 
(1981). The articulable facts, along with 
the rational inferences, "must be seen and 
weighed not in terms of library analysis by 
scholars, but as understood by those versed 
in the field of law enforcement" Cortex, 
449 U.S. at 418,101 S.Ct at 695. Thus, we 
review the basis for the intrusion to deter-
mine whether the officer "observes un-
usual conduct which leads him reasonably 
to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot...." Terry, 
892 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct at 1884. 
[6,7] Our analysis must focus on Offi-
cer Jensen's reasonable suspicions as to 
Munsen and not Hunter. The officer 
"must have a particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity." Cortex, 449 
U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct at 695 (emphasis 
added). See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 
85, 91, 100 S.Ct 838, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 
(1979). The mere fact that Munsen was 
with Hunter does not necessarily conjoin 
her actions with his. A "person's mere 
propinquity to others independently sus-
pected of criminal activity does not, with-
out more, give rise to probable cause to 
search that person." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 
91, 100 S.Ct at 342. See Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S.Ct 2637, 2641, 61 
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (mere presence in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users 
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion); 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 
68 S.Ct 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) ("Pre-
sumptions of guilt are not lightly to be 
indulged from mere meetings."); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no 
reasonable suspicion where man walking 
near defendant had run away). 
however, the "detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectu-
ate the purpose of the stop;" (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has proba-
ble cause to believe an offense has been com-
mitted or Is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. 
Merritt, 736 FJd 223. 230 (5th Cir.1984)). 
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In the present case, the court found that 
Munsen was first seen emerging from a 
twenty-four hour grocery store at 3:30 
a.m., walking toward Hunter's truck, which 
was parked by itself, with no other vehicles 
or people in the area. The court made no 
findings as to the lighting, the remoteness, 
or the accessibility of the area. 
[8] The lateness of the hour, as it re-
lates to the twenty-four hour grocery store, 
has no particular significance when evalu-
ating reasonable suspicion. State v. Men-
doza, 748 P.2d 181, 183-84 (Utah 1987) 
provides an apt analogy. The court in 
Mendoza held that the fact that a car was 
stopped at 4:50 a.m. on an interstate high-
way was of "little relevance" because 
"travelers use the interstate highway at all 
times of the day and night " Id. See 
also State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (no reasonable 
suspicion to stop vehicle with out-of-state 
plates moving slowly through frequently 
burglarized neighborhood at 3:00 a.m.); 8 
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c) at 
456 (lateness of hour should be considered 
in relation to other factors including "the 
location—its remoteness, available lighting, 
the presence of others nearby and its acces-
sibility."). 
The court made a conclusory finding that 
her answers were "inconsistent, vague and 
suspicious." Although the court labels this 
a "finding," it is more accurately character-
ized as a conclusion. See State v. Vigil, 
816 P.2d 1296, 1297-99 (Utah App.1991) 
(distinction between findings of facts and 
conclusions of law based on substantive 
analysis notwithstanding label applied by 
trial court). This "finding" actually ap-
pears to summarize the previous, more spe-
cific findings relating Munsen's answers to 
Officer Jensen's questions. 
[9,10] Therefore, in determining wheth-
er the findings adequately support a con-
clusion of reasonable suspicion, we view 
2. In evaluating evasive and suspicious responses 
we have held that a defendant's nervous con-
duct when questioned by an officer "is consist-
ent with innocent as well as with criminal be-
the conclusory finding in light of the specif-
ic findings as .- her answers. To wit: 
Munsen was aaked if she knew Hunter and 
she answered affirmatively. She was 
asked who owned the driver's license, and 
she responded that she did not know who 
owned it nor how it got in the truck. She 
was asked how long she knew him and she 
said she had known him about a year. So 
far, her answers were consistent, direct, 
and appropriate. Finally, she was asked 
the name of her companion, and she an-
swered that it was Hunt or Hunter. This 
is the only answer that could even possibly 
be considered equivocal. However, this an-
swer is not inconsistent, vague and suspi-
cious.1 More to the point, her answer, con-
sidered in light of the totality of the cir-
cumstances, did not reasonably create a 
particularized and objective basis to sus-
pect Munsen of any criminal activity. 
[11] We therefore conclude that the tri-
al court erred in ruling that Officer Jensen 
had a reasonable suspicion to justify the 
level two seizure of Munsen. Thus, the 
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal 
detention should be suppressed. "If a sei-
zure occurs and the police are unable to 
point to the specific and articulable facts 
that justified that seizure, the seizure vio-
lates the fourth amendment of the United 
States Constitution, and evidence obtained 
as a result of the illegal seizure must be 
excluded." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786 (cit-
ing Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct at 1876). 
Accordingly, we reverse the order deny-
ing Munsen's motion to suppress, and thus 
the resulting conviction. We remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
RUSSON, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring in result 
only): 
I would reach the same result with dif-
ferent analysis. Although the officer had 
the area,' and the behavior of a suspect who 
appears to be evading police contact." United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 VS. 544, 564. 100 
SCt. 1870. 1882. 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (quoting 
STATE v. MUNSEN Utah 1*7 
< * • « • « ! *** U (VtabApp. 1991) 1 T 
reasonable suspicion to justify Munsen's 1991). Cf. State v Holmes. 774 P2d ttifi 
detention, I think the length and scope of (Utah App.198^ ^ ** 
the detention was not justified by the cir-
*~w.-. . .w«a mrj MIC U l ' 
cumstances. The warrants check was ex-
cessive without further inquiry. State v. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763-764 (Utah 
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